Medicare recently launched the Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier (PVBM) Program, a mandatory pay-for-performance program for physician practices. Little is known about performance by practices that serve socially or medically high-risk patients.
A mbulatory pay-for-performance programs provide incentives for physician practices to improve the care they deliver. The Medicare Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier (PVBM) Program, which launched in 2015, will be the largest mandatory pay-for-performance program for physicians when fully phased in. Under this program, physician practices receive penalties or bonuses (from −1% to 10% of Medicare payments in 2015) based on the quality and costs of care. The PVBM Program serves as a precursor to the Medicare Quality Payment Program, which will launch in 2019, apply to clinicians and practices, and measure performance across a broader array of metrics. Clinicians eligible in the PVBM Program include physicians, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants.
Despite the growth of ambulatory pay-for-performance programs, there is concern about unintended consequences, including disproportionately penalizing practices that care for complex patients. Prior studies have shown that patients with high levels of medical risk as well as patients with social risk factors, such as those dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid, have worse quality outcomes.
1,2 Thus, it is possible that physician practices that care for these high-risk populations will fare poorly in pay-for-performance programs. The PVBM Program has instituted safeguards such as risk adjustment, eliminating measures with extreme performance values, and using conservative performance thresholds for bonuses and penalties to mitigate potential risks faced by participating practices. However, there are no prior studies of the PVBM Program and little is known about performance patterns. Therefore, this study sought to answer 3 questions. What are the patient, practice, and clinician characteristics of large physician practices that serve a disproportionate share of medically or socially high-risk patients? How did large practices perform on quality and cost performance metrics included in the PVBM Program? What implications did any performance differences have on payment?
Methods

Data Sources and Study Population
We performed a cross-sectional observational study using PVBM Program data for payments made in 2015 based on performance of large US physician practices caring for fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries in 2013. To characterize physician practices, we used the Provider Enrollment, Chain, and Ownership System, PVBM Program data, and the Medicare Electronic Health Record Incentive Program Eligible Professionals Public Use File.
Performance metrics are based on a core set of claimsbased mandatory measures as well as more than 200 elective measures from a variety of sources (eg, registries, claims, medical record-based data submitted to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services [CMS] via a web interface). Policy research at the US Department of Health and Human Services that uses secondary, administrative, and deidentified data does not require approval by an institutional review board or informed consent.
The study sample consisted of physician practices that were eligible for the PVBM Program during its first year (ie, practices that were not participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program or the Comprehensive Primary Care Initiative and had ≥100 physicians or other clinicians), and had at least 1 attributed fee-for-service Medicare beneficiary. These data were linked to Medicare claims from 2013 to identify patients and physicians. Fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries were attributed to practices using the PVBM algorithm, which is based on the setting where a beneficiary received the plurality of primary care services. 3 
Primary Exposures
Following PVBM Program parameters, 3 physician practices with a mean Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) risk score greater than the 75th percentile among all fee-for-service beneficiaries were categorized as practices with high medical risk (eFigure 1 in the Supplement). Similarly, physician practices in the top quartile of the proportion of attributed beneficiaries who were dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid (defined as enrollment in Medicaid in January 2013) were categorized as practices with high social risk (eFigure 2 in the Supplement). From these 2 primary exposures, we created 4 mutually exclusive groups: (1) low risk (neither high social nor high medical risk); (2) high medical risk only; (3) high social risk only; and (4) high medical and social risk.
Primary Outcome Measures
The primary outcome measures were the PVBM Program quality composite score and cost composite score. 3 Each practice's composite scores are based on a combination of mandatory and elective measures of their choosing. The quality score is reported as a z score and is based on performance across 6 domains: clinical process and effectiveness, patient and family engagement, population and public health, patient safety, care coordination, and efficient use of health care resources (eAppendix and eTable 1 in the Supplement). For a given domain or measure, a z score was created by taking the practice's performance and subtracting the average performance of comparison practices. This difference was then divided by the measure's standard deviation among all comparison practices, producing a z score. For a given measure, the comparison practices were the subset of practices with data for that
Key Points
Question Was there an association between the social or medical risk of patients treated at physician practices and performance during the first year of the Medicare Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier Program?
Findings Practices that served more socially high-risk patients had lower quality and lower costs, and practices that served more medically high-risk patients had lower quality and higher costs. These patterns were associated with fewer bonuses and more penalties for high-risk practices.
Meaning As value-based payment programs continue to increase in size and scope, practices that disproportionately serve high-risk patients may be at particular risk of receiving financial penalties.
measure. The cost score is also reported as a z score and is composed of the 2 domains of total per capita costs for all attributed beneficiaries and per capita costs for beneficiaries with specific conditions, which were averaged to create a cost composite for each practice. The secondary outcome measures for quality were individual metrics, including the following mandatory, claims-based quality measures used in the PVBM Program: (1) all-cause readmissions (risk-adjustment model included age and a number of clinical comorbidities as specified by the CMS), (2) admissions for acute ambulatory care-sensitive conditions (adjusted for age and sex), and (3) admissions for chronic ambulatory care-sensitive conditions (adjusted for age and sex).
The secondary outcome measures for costs were the following mandatory, claims-based metrics calculated by the CMS for the PVBM Program: (1) total per capita costs and per capita costs for (2) heart failure, (3) diabetes mellitus, (4) chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and (5) coronary artery disease. The CMS payment standardizes the per capita cost measures to account for geographic differences in prices, and includes risk adjustment to account for patient case mix. The risk-adjustment model controls for HCC risk score, HCC risk score squared, and end-stage renal disease. The HCC risk score includes 70 categories corresponding to specific groups of International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, diagnosis codes and age, sex, Medicaid, and original reason for Medicare qualification (ie, age or disability). Measure performance was reported as a z score and as an absolute value (eg, $1000).
The other secondary outcomes were payment adjustments (ie, performance-based bonus, no adjustment, penalty for not reporting, performance-based penalty). These were determined by following program parameters from the CMS. Physician practices that failed to successfully register for the program and report a minimum number of measures received an automatic penalty for not reporting (nonparticipation).
Practices were categorized as high or low quality (or high or low cost) only if their z score for quality (or cost) was more than 1 SD from the peer group mean and the difference was statistically significant. Physician practices that elected to tie performance to payment received a penalty if they had (1) low quality and high or average cost or (2) average quality and high cost. Physician practices received an upward payment adjustment if they had (1) high quality and low or average cost or (2) average quality and low cost (eTable 2 in the Supplement). All other practices received no adjustment.
Statistical Analysis
The characteristics of the 4 types of physician practices were compared using χ 2 tests. To compare differences in performance on the outcomes listed earlier, we used quality and cost metrics calculated by the CMS and z scores for domain and composite scores. Using the CMS' performance metrics, we created unadjusted ordinary least-squares regression models with practice type as the primary predictor. For the practices that did not have a sufficient number of cases for individual measures, we did not impute missing values. This mirrors the PVBM Program's approach. We also described how payments differed across practice types. In our first set of analyses, we reported on actual bonuses and penalties, only assigning performance-based penalties to those practices that elected this option. In a set of exploratory analyses, we used performance data to simulate bonuses and penalties for all participating practices because performance-based payment is mandatory starting in 2016 for large physician practices. Ordered logit regression models were used to test for statistically significant differences in payments between the 4 physician practice risk categories.
We used Stata statistical software version 13 (StataCorp) and SAS version 9.4 (SAS Institute Inc). Two-sided P <. 01 was considered statistically significant to account for multiple testing.
Results
Patient, Physician, and Practice Characteristics
Among 899 physician practices with 5 189 880 attributed beneficiaries, 547 practices were categorized as low risk (neither high social risk nor high medical risk) (mean, 7909 beneficiaries; mean, 320 clinicians), 128 were high medical risk only (mean, 3675 beneficiaries; mean, 370 clinicians), 102 were high social risk only (mean, 1635 beneficiaries; mean, 284 clinicians), and 122 were high medical and social risk (mean, 1858 beneficiaries; mean, 269 clinicians) ( Table 1) . Although 79.2% of low-risk practices successfully registered and reported data to the program (thus avoiding the automatic reporting penalty), this was done in only 69.5% of practices with high medical risk only, 47.1% of practices with high social risk only, and 54.1% of practices with high medical and social risk.
High-risk practices served patient populations that were generally younger and more often of ethnic minority, dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid, and disabled (Table 1) . For example, 8% of patients treated at low-risk practices were black, 16% at practices with high medical risk only, 24% at practices with high social risk only, and 31% at practices with both high medical and social risk (P < .001). There were few major differences in physician specialty or practice size across practice types (Table 1 ). However, stage 1 meaningful use (defined as the adoption of certified electronic health records across a number of dimensions as specified by the CMS) was higher in practices categorized as low risk (31%) and high medical risk only (29%) compared with practices categorized as high social risk only (8%) and high medical and social risk (14%) (P < .001).
Performance on Domain and Composite Scores
Practices categorized as low risk performed the best on the composite quality score (z score, 0. 
Performance on PVBM Program Quality and Cost Measures
Risk-adjusted readmission rates were lowest at practices categorized as low risk (15.3%) compared with practices categorized as high medical risk only (16.3%; difference from low risk, 1.01% [95% CI, 0.79%-1.23%]; P < .001), high social risk only (15.9%; difference from low risk, 0.58% [95% CI, 0.31%-0.85%]; P < .001), and high medical and social risk (16.6%; difference from low risk, 1.32% [95% CI, 1.08%-1.55%]; P < .001; Table 2 ). Compared with low-risk practices, admissions for acute ambulatory care-sensitive conditions were higher in the practices categorized as high medical risk only and high medical and social risk practices. In contrast, admissions for chronic ambulatory care-sensitive conditions were similar across groups.
The total per capita costs were $9506 for practices categorized as low risk, $13 683 for high medical risk only (difference from low risk, $4177 [95% CI, $3437 to $4917]; P < .001), $8214 for high social risk only (difference from low risk, −$1292 [95% CI, −$2105 to −$480]; P = .002), and $11 692 for high medical and social risk (difference from low risk, $2186 [95% CI, $1432 to $2940]; P < .001) ( Table 2 ). Patterns were similar for the condition-specific cost measures.
Penalties and Bonuses
Only 112 physician practices opted to receive performancebased payment during the first year of the PVBM Program (when performance-based bonuses and penalties were optional). Thus, actual penalties were largely driven by failure to register and report data (Table 3 and eTables 4 and 5 in the Supplement). Such penalties were more common in practices categorized as high social risk only (20.8% of lowrisk practices were penalized for failure to register and report data, 30.5% of high medical risk only, 52.9% of high social risk only, and 45.9% of high medical and social risk). In simulations in which performance-based bonuses and penalties were applied to all practices with sufficient data, practices categorized as high medical risk only or high medical and social risk had a higher likelihood of receiving a performancebased penalty (3.7% of low-risk practices were penalized for poor performance, 18.0% of high medical risk only, 9.8% of high social risk only, and 13.1% of high medical and social risk) ( Table 4 and eTables 6 and 7 in the Supplement). b Adjusted for age and sex. Acute ACSCs include admissions for bacterial pneumonia, urinary tract infections, and dehydration. Chronic ACSCs include admissions for short-term and long-term complications from diabetes, uncontrolled diabetes, and lower-extremity amputation among patients with diabetes; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease or asthma among older adults; and heart failure.
Discussion
In this analysis of the first year of Medicare's new physician pay-for-performance program based on 899 practices with 5 189 880 attributed Medicare beneficiaries, performance patterns differed by physician practice type. Compared with practices categorized as low risk, practices with high medical risk only and with high medical and social risk had lower quality and higher costs, whereas practices with high social risk only had lower quality but lower costs. Because of a high frequency of failure to register and report data as well as these differences in performance, physician practices that served a disproportionate share of medically and socially high-risk patients were more likely to receive a penalty compared with other practices. The largest driver of penalties during the first year of the PVBM Program was failure to successfully register and report. Even though some percentage of practices failing to participate may reflect an active choice, some may reflect a lack of infrastructure or technology that makes reporting more difficult, particularly among high-risk practices that may lack access to electronic health records and other supporting factors. This may be an important area for technical support as the PVBM Program expands to include a broader range of practices and as penalties for failure to participate grow with the advent of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) in 2019.
Medical risk was associated with both worse quality and higher costs. The mechanism underlying these relationships is unclear. The findings from prior studies have been mixed, with some studies finding that patients with multiple chronic conditions are more likely to receive high-quality care, 4-6 and others finding that the relationship between multimorbidity and quality is neutral or depends on the type of comorbidity present. 7, 8 Research is less mixed for costs; many prior studies show that patients with more severe illness use more medical care and require more resources, 9-11 which is the basis for risk adjustment of costs under this and other programs that assess clinicians' performance on costs of care. Without patient-level analyses, it is difficult to determine whether these higher costs are driven by inadequate risk adjustment or by a high-intensity practice style, and this warrants future research. The finding that practices categorized as high social risk only performed significantly worse on quality metrics is similar to previously described patterns in other care settings also subject to differential payment based on quality, such as safety-net hospitals under Medicare's value-based payment programs [12] [13] [14] Patients treated at practices categorized as high social risk only may face basic challenges such as transportation, food, housing, and security, which are unmeasured in Medicare claims but may be associated with outcomes. In some cases, fewer resources may also make it more difficult for practices who serve these patients to attract qualified clinicians. With regard to costs of care, practices categorized as high social risk only in the PVBM Program were less expensive than practices that served a lower-risk population. These findings may in part be explained by the PVBM Program's 
Conclusions
During the first year of the Medicare Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier Program, physician practices that served more socially high-risk patients had lower quality and lower costs, and practices that served more medically high-risk patients had lower quality and higher costs. 
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eFigure 1. Distribution of the Average Medical Risk of Patients by Practice, 2013
Note: Total number of practices is 899. Bin width is 0.05 (lower limit is equal to 0 and upper limit is less than 0.05, in intervals of 0.05). Practices above the cut-off point are high medical complexity practices. Note: Total number of practices is 899. Bin width is 2% (lower limit is equal 0% and upper limit is less than 2%, in intervals of 2%). Practices above the cut-off point are high social risk practices. 
eAppendix. Additional Information About the VM Program
The VM Program tied performance on quality and costs of care to bonuses and penalties for large medical practices of 100 or more eligible professionals, beginning in 2015. Eligible medical practices that did not register for the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS) and report at least one measure, or elect the administrative claims reporting option, received an automatic penalty of -1% applied to 2015 payments. On the other hand, medical practices that met minimum reporting requirements could elect quality tiering, which meant that payment adjustments were tied to performance via a "value modifier" that resulted in a reward, penalty or neither (i.e., a neutral adjustment).
For such medical practices, there was a maximum penalty of -1% and a maximum bonus of +2%*adjustment factor. The adjustment factor ensures that across medical practices, penalties will equal bonuses; in 2015 the adjustment factor was +4.89, so the actual maximum bonus was nearly 10%. In subsequent years of the program, smaller medical practices will become eligible for the VM Program, quality tiering will become mandatory, and penalties will increase to -4% and bonuses to +4%*adjustment factor.
In the first year of the VM Program, practices had to report on quality using one of three mechanisms, each with its own minimum reporting requirement: 1) the Group Practice Reporting Option web interface with 24 measures, 2) a qualified registry with at least three measures chosen from the more than 200 quality metrics offered, or 3) a standard claims-based panel with 14 measures. Additionally, for all practices, there were three mandatory, claims-based quality metrics: readmissions, admissions for acute ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs), and admissions for chronic ACSCs. The all-condition readmission measure, as specified by CMS, is risk-adjusted for age and a number of clinical comorbidities. The ACSC measures are adjusted only for age and gender, although for chronic ACSCs all eligible cases must have the chronic condition of interest. For all measures, performance was reported as a z-score, representing the number of standard deviations from the peer group mean. The peer group for a given quality measure was all US practices with at least 20 eligible cases for the measure.
In the first year of the VM Program, practices had to report on quality using one of three mechanisms, each with its own minimum reporting requirement: 1) the Group Practice Reporting Option web interface with 24 measures, 2) a qualified registry with at least three measures chosen from the more than 200 quality metrics offered, or 3) a standard claims-based panel with 14 measures. Additionally, for all practices, there were three mandatory, claims-based quality metrics: readmissions, admissions for acute ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs), and admissions for chronic ACSCs.
Quality measures were categorized within one of six domains (clinical process/effectiveness, patient and family engagement, population/public health, patient safety, care coordination, and efficient use of health care resources). The mandatory quality measures were all part of the care coordination domain. Measure scores based on at least 20 cases were averaged to create domain scores. Thus, for a given domain, the measures included in that domain could vary among practices. Of the six quality domains, two (patient and family engagement, and efficient use of health care resources) applied to fewer than 10 practices, and thus were not included in our performance analyses. Domain scores were equally weighted and averaged to create a quality composite for each practice; if a practice did not have any measures in a particular domain, that domain was not included in the composite. 
